The 2027 Budget plans K284.8bn of spending, +12.5% on 2026, with K41.9bn borrowed and 23.7% going on debt service. What it spends, how it is paid for, and how past budgets held up.

KSJ Budget Analysis: The 2027 Budget

Zambia 2027 Budget Analysis

Zambia is reorganising Government around the Grow Zambia Agenda. That makes sense. But there is a point at which dividing Government into smaller pieces stops making it more efficient — and starts making it harder to govern.Government has proposed a new structure of 30 ministries, with Parliament expected to consider the proposal today. The changes would split several existing portfolios, including Energy into Electricity and Petroleum; Commerce, Trade and Industry into Trade and Exports, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprise Development; Education into Education and Skills and Higher Education; and Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development into Infrastructure and Urban Development and Housing.On the surface, there is a reasonable argument for the changes.Government cannot pursue a serious industrialisation and export agenda with an institutional structure that does not give those objectives sufficient policy attention. Zambia wants to produce more, process more, export more, develop skills, attract investment and create jobs. The machinery of Government should therefore reflect those priorities.The Grow Zambia Agenda is, in that sense, the strongest argument for the restructuring.But the question Parliament should ask is not whether the new ministries sound sensible individually. It is whether the system works better collectively.That distinction is important.There is a concept in Latin logic called reductio ad absurdum: take an argument to its logical extreme and see whether it still makes sense. Applied to Government, the argument for greater specialisation sounds straightforward — if a ministry is too broad, split it so that each part can focus.But if splitting makes things better, why stop at 30?Why not have one ministry for electricity generation, another for transmission, another for distribution and another for rural electrification? Why not have separate ministries for copper exports, agricultural exports and manufactured exports? Why not separate large enterprises from medium enterprises and medium enterprises from small enterprises?At some point, specialisation becomes fragmentation.And this is where the proposed structure deserves serious scrutiny.The economy does not operate in ministries. It operates in value chains.A manufacturer needs electricity. It needs transport. It needs skilled workers. It needs finance. It needs access to markets. If it exports, it needs trade facilitation. If it is an SME, it may need enterprise support. If it processes agricultural products, it sits simultaneously in agriculture, industry and trade.Government can divide those responsibilities administratively, but the business cannot divide its problem into six ministries.This means the proposed structure can only work if specialisation inside Government is accompanied by much stronger coordination across Government.The proposed Energy split is perhaps the clearest example.There is a sensible case for separating electricity and petroleum policy. Electricity has become a major constraint on economic activity and requires sustained attention to generation, transmission, distribution, tariffs, investment, regional power trading and the reform of ZESCO. Petroleum has a different set of challenges, including fuel imports, storage, strategic reserves, pricing, pipelines and supply security.Giving each subsector a dedicated political and policy focus is therefore not unreasonable.But then comes the institutional question.What happens to the regulator?Today, the Energy Regulation Board regulates both electricity and petroleum under the Energy Regulation Act of 2019. The ERB is not simply an electricity institution or a petroleum institution. It is the regulator for the wider energy sector.So Zambia could soon have two policy ministries sitting above one energy regulator.That is not necessarily a problem.In fact, there is a strong argument for keeping one regulator. Electricity and petroleum are different markets, but both require specialised technical regulation, licensing, consumer protection and enforcement. Maintaining one regulator can avoid duplicating boards, management structures, legal departments and technical capacity.But if Government eventually decides that the ministerial split also requires an Electricity Regulatory Board and a Petroleum Regulatory Board, Parliament should ask a very simple question:What problem does creating two regulators solve?If the answer is better regulation, Government should demonstrate it.If the answer is simply that there are now two ministries, that is not enough.The danger is that Zambia could create two ministries, two regulators, two boards and two bureaucracies to perform functions that previously sat within one institutional framework.That would be the reductio ad absurdum of administrative reform: creating more institutions in the name of efficiency until the State becomes more expensive and less coordinated.The same issue appears in the proposed split of Commerce, Trade and Industry.There is a logic to having separate portfolios for Trade and Exports, Industry, and SMEs. Trade policy is different from industrial policy. Industrial policy is different from enterprise development.But the boundaries will inevitably overlap.Take a Zambian company producing processed honey for export. It is an SME. It is an industrial producer. It is an exporter. It may require standards, finance, electricity, transport and access to international markets.Which ministry owns its problem?Ideally, the business should not care.That is what a modern public administration should achieve: specialisation behind the scenes and simplicity in front of the citizen.If the opposite happens — three ministries, three sets of procedures and three sets of officials for one business — then the reform has increased Government's complexity rather than the country's productive capacity.There is also a less glamorous question: money.Every new ministry has the potential to create additional administrative costs. Ministers, permanent secretaries, directors, offices, vehicles, support staff, ICT systems and procurement structures all cost money.The debate should therefore not be reduced to whether 30 ministries is "too many".Thirty ministries may be perfectly manageable if the structure largely reallocates existing resources and produces better results.Conversely, even 20 ministries could be too many if they create expensive bureaucratic silos.The relevant question is:What will this restructuring cost, and what will Zambia get in return?That is the number Parliament should want to see.There is also a question of performance.A Ministry of Electricity should not be considered successful because it exists. It should be successful because electricity becomes more reliable, investment increases and businesses face fewer power-related constraints.A Ministry of Trade and Exports should not be judged by the number of trade missions it organises. It should be judged by whether Zambia exports more products to more markets.An Industry ministry should be judged by manufacturing and value addition.An SME ministry should be judged by whether more Zambian businesses survive, grow, formalise and employ people.A Skills and Higher Education ministry should ultimately be judged by whether the economy gets workers with skills that employers actually need.The ministry is the input. The outcome is the point.This is why Parliament's role should not simply be to count ministries.It should ask Government to show the architecture behind them.What functions are moving? Which agencies are moving? How much will the transition cost? Where will mandates overlap? How will ministries coordinate? What happens to the ERB? What are the performance indicators? And, crucially, what changes for a citizen or business trying to get something done?The proposed restructuring can be defended as an attempt to align Government with the Grow Zambia Agenda.And that agenda itself deserves serious support. Zambia needs to move from an economy that is heavily dependent on extracting and exporting commodities toward one that produces, processes, exports and creates productive employment.But reorganising Government is not the same thing as reforming Government.A new ministry does not automatically produce a new factory.A new portfolio does not automatically create electricity.A new permanent secretary does not automatically increase exports.The institutional structure matters because it determines who is accountable for delivering those things. But structure is only useful when it improves execution.The real test of the 30-ministry proposal should therefore be quite simple.Will it make Government better at delivering the Grow Zambia Agenda?If the answer is yes, Parliament should support it.But support should come with conditions: clear mandates, transparent transition costs, strong coordination, regulatory independence and measurable performance targets.Zambia does not necessarily need fewer ministries.It needs less fragmentation, clearer accountability and better execution.Because the ultimate measure of this reform will not be the number of ministries around the Cabinet table.It will be whether, five years from now, Zambia has more electricity, more exports, more industry, more productive SMEs, more skilled workers and better public services.Otherwise, we may simply have succeeded in reorganising the State without reorganising the economy.

Cabinet realignment: the reductio ad absurdum test for Grow Zambia

What if the problems facing a society do not begin in Parliament, government offices or economic statistics—but much earlier, in the way people think?That is the central question explored in The Republic Within: How Thought Governs Nations, Shapes Generations and Decides History, a book by Kenny Suze, Research and Policy Lead at Impact Center for Policy Research, security strategist and author.Suze’s argument is straightforward but ambitious: before societies are shaped by laws, institutions, economies or political systems, they are shaped by ideas.Beliefs, values, assumptions and everyday habits of thought can influence how individuals behave, how leaders exercise responsibility, how institutions function and, over time, the direction of entire societies.The book moves between the individual and the nation, examining how private choices can become public norms.A culture of responsibility, for example, can reinforce stronger institutions. Conversely, habits that tolerate corruption, avoid accountability or discourage initiative can become embedded in society and eventually appear as institutional problems.This makes the book less about politics in the conventional sense and more about the foundations beneath politics.Suze explores themes including leadership, corruption, innovation, conflict, responsibility and social development through the lens of mindset and character. The underlying question is not simply what a society has built, but what kind of thinking produced it.That perspective also gives the book an intergenerational dimension.Ideas do not necessarily disappear with the people who first hold them. They can be passed through families, institutions, education, culture and social expectations. In that sense, each generation inherits not only institutions and infrastructure, but also ways of understanding the world.For readers interested in Zambia and Africa’s development, the premise raises a broader question: how much of development is ultimately about changing systems, and how much depends on changing the thinking that operates those systems?The Republic Within does not present itself as a conventional political programme or a blueprint for governance. Instead, it is a reflection on citizenship, leadership and responsibility—and on the less visible intellectual foundations of public life.Its central challenge is perhaps its simplest: if societies want to change their future, they may also need to examine the ideas and values from which that future is being built.About the authorKenny Suze is a Research and Policy Lead at Impact Center for Policy Research, a security strategist and author whose work explores leadership, mindset transformation, social development and the ideas that shape society.

Kenny Suze’s The Republic Within: The Ideas That Shape Nations

A Winning Fiscal Strategy for Zambia: From Ministry-Centric Budgeting to Provincial Equity

Zambia is moving to centralise the buying and export of gold as Government looks for tighter control over a sector that has expanded rapidly but remains difficult to trace.The Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development is developing a proposed Zambia Gold Trade Agency, which would become the central channel for gold intended for export.Permanent Secretary Hapenga Kabeta said the agency is currently at draft stage and undergoing legal consideration. Under the proposed arrangement, the entity would buy gold destined for export, with the Bank of Zambia able to acquire its share for reserves.The move is part of a wider attempt to formalise Zambia's artisanal and small-scale gold sector. <h2>From gold rush to formal market</h2>Zambia's gold industry has traditionally received far less attention than copper.That is changing.A growing artisanal and small-scale mining sector has created new economic activity, but also concerns around illegal mining, smuggling, weak traceability and lost government revenue.Government has already been working on formalisation through mining cooperatives, training and designated market infrastructure. Parliament was told in 2025 that Zambia Gold Company had been appointed as the gold aggregator and had begun buying gold at market centres in Rufunsa and Mumbwa.The proposed Gold Trade Agency appears to take that approach further by creating a more centralised system for gold destined for export. <h2>Traceability becomes the critical piece</h2>Centralised buying alone will not solve the problem.The gold needs to be traceable from the mine to the buyer.That is why discussions between Government and the World Gold Council have included traceability technology, processing facilities and formal trading systems.For Zambia, traceability could have implications well beyond enforcement.It can help establish where gold is coming from, whether miners are operating legally and how much of the country's production is actually entering formal markets.The Minerals Regulation Commission Act already requires people trading minerals to hold the appropriate permit, while recognising gold as a precious metal.The challenge is making the formal route commercially attractive enough for miners to use it. <h2>The price of formalisation</h2>This may ultimately be the most important question.Small-scale miners will use formal channels if those channels provide a competitive price, reliable payment, accessible buying points and a process that is easier than selling through informal networks.If compliance is expensive or cumbersome while informal buyers offer immediate cash, regulation alone may not be enough to change behaviour.That is why the government's wider formalisation programme — including training and market access — matters.Government has also been considering changes to the tax treatment of gold trading, following concerns raised by the World Gold Council about the cost of formal transactions. No new VAT rate has been announced, but the issue illustrates the balancing act involved in bringing more gold into the formal economy. <h2>Processing could keep more value in Zambia</h2>The other part of the equation is what happens after the gold is bought.A more formal supply chain creates an opportunity for processing and refining capacity to develop locally.A Zambian gold company is currently setting up a processing facility, according to the Ministry's latest engagement with industry stakeholders.That matters because the economic value of gold is not limited to extraction.Buying, processing, refining, logistics, testing and financial services can all form part of a domestic gold economy.Zambia has spent decades building its mining economy around copper. Gold presents an opportunity to develop another mineral value chain — but only if production can be brought into a system that is transparent, competitive and commercially viable.The proposed agency is still at the drafting stage.Its real significance will therefore depend less on the name of the institution than on whether it can make formal gold trading easier, traceable and worthwhile for the people producing the metal.Zambia may have more gold than its official export figures suggest. The challenge now is to build a system capable of showing exactly where it comes from, who buys it and how much value remains in the country.

Zambia Moves to Put Gold Trade Under One Roof

President Hakainde Hichilema will on October 9 this year officially open the First Session of the 14th National Assembly, where he is expected to outline Government’s policy direction and priorities for the 2026 2027 period.Clerk of the National Assembly Loveness Mayaka said the ceremonial opening will take place at Parliament Buildings in Lusaka.Ms Mayaka said during the ceremonial opening, President Hichilema will deliver an address outlining Government’s policy direction and priorities, after which Members of Parliament (MPs) will debate the pronouncements contained in the address.She said the election of presiding officers for the 14th National Assembly will be held on October 2.And Ms Mayaka said newly-elected MPs under the mixed-member proportional representation system will register at Parliament tomorrow ahead of their swearing-in on Monday, September 21.She said the members are required to present the relevant documents, including Zambia Qualifications Authority (ZAQA)-verified qualifications, passports and proof of residency, where applicable.

HH set to open Parley on Oct 9

A strange August shower in Lusaka may have been easy to dismiss. But behind the unusual weather is a much bigger story about a changing climate, an approaching El Niño and the economic risks Zambia should already be preparing for.On 13 August, Zambia had other things on its mind.The country was consumed by elections. Conversations revolved around polling stations, voters, political parties, turnout, results and what the next five years might look like. For a few days, almost everything else seemed secondary.And then, in parts of Lusaka, it rained. Not November rain. Not December rain. Not the familiar afternoon downpour that arrives after the clouds have gathered over the capital during the wet season. August rain.For most people, it was probably little more than an oddity. Some may have welcomed it. Others may simply have carried on with their day. In a country where rain is such a familiar part of life, it is easy to forget just how unusual rainfall can be during the heart of the dry season.Zambia's rainfall follows a remarkably distinct seasonal pattern. The wet season generally runs from around September or October through April, driven largely by the movement of the tropical rain belt. August, by contrast, sits firmly within the country's dry and cool season. The IMF describes the period from May to August as particularly dry, while climate assessments of Zambia note that rainfall is generally concentrated in the wet season.So an August shower in Lusaka is not, by itself, evidence of climate change. Nor can we say that El Niño caused the rain. Weather is too complicated for that kind of conclusion.But perhaps that is precisely why we should pay attention.The important climate story is not necessarily that it rained on one unusual August afternoon. It is that the weather patterns on which Zambia's economy has depended for generations are becoming increasingly difficult to take for granted.Climate change does not always announce itself with a dramatic flood or a catastrophic drought. Sometimes it appears in smaller ways: an unusually warm winter morning, a strange dry spell, a storm arriving at the wrong time, rainfall becoming more erratic, or a season beginning differently from what farmers have come to expect.These events can seem insignificant when viewed individually. Their significance becomes clearer when they form part of a longer pattern.And now, as Zambia looks towards the 2026–27 rainy season, another warning is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.El Niño is coming.In fact, it is already developing. The World Meteorological Organization warned earlier this year that El Niño was expected to develop from mid-2026, with the phenomenon likely to influence global temperature and rainfall patterns. By June, the WMO was putting the probability of El Niño continuing into November at around 90 percent or higher. The latest forecasts are even more striking.On 13 August — the same day Zambians were going to the polls — the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Climate Prediction Center issued an El Niño Advisory. Its latest assessment puts the probability of a very strong El Niño at more than 90 percent during the Northern Hemisphere autumn and winter of 2026–27. There is also a 69 percent probability that the October–December period could reach historically extreme levels.That does not mean Zambia will automatically experience a drought. El Niño is a global climate phenomenon and its local effects are complicated. But Southern Africa is one of the regions where the relationship between El Niño and rainfall has historically mattered greatly.For Zambia, that should immediately get the attention of anyone thinking seriously about the economy.We have been here before. The 2023–24 El Niño season produced one of the worst droughts Zambia had experienced in decades. Agriculture was badly affected, food insecurity increased and the country's dependence on hydropower became a major economic vulnerability. The drought demonstrated something that economists sometimes forget when constructing models: rainfall is an economic variable.When the rains fail, maize production suffers. When maize production falls, food prices come under pressure. When water levels decline, hydropower generation suffers. When electricity becomes unreliable, businesses reduce production or increase their operating costs. When farmers lose income, rural demand weakens. When food and electricity have to be imported, foreign-exchange pressures can increase.A climatic shock can therefore move through an economy in much the same way as a financial shock.It starts in the atmosphere and eventually arrives in household budgets, business balance sheets and government accounts.That is why the coming El Niño should not be treated as a story exclusively for farmers.It is a story for the Bank of Zambia. It is a story for the Ministry of Finance. It is a story for ZESCO, farmers, manufacturers, banks, retailers and investors. It is a story for anyone trying to understand Zambia's inflation, food security, electricity supply and economic growth over the next twelve months.The African Union has already been urging countries to move away from simply responding to climate disasters after they occur and towards anticipatory action. Its 2026 continental discussions on El Niño have specifically highlighted agriculture, energy, water, infrastructure, health and other climate-sensitive sectors.That is the right approach.Because the biggest mistake Zambia could make is to wait for the drought to become obvious before treating it as a serious economic risk.By then, the farmer may already have planted. The reservoir may already be falling. The electricity deficit may already be appearing. The price of maize may already be rising.Preparation works precisely because it happens before the crisis becomes visible.And there is a particularly uncomfortable irony about the timing of all this.Zambia has spent much of 2026 looking at politics. The election has understandably consumed public attention. The country has been debating who should lead, what policies should change and what the next political chapter will look like.But while we have been watching the ballot, another process has been unfolding thousands of kilometres away in the Pacific Ocean.El Niño does not care about election calendars.It will not wait for the new government to settle in. It will not wait for the Cabinet to be appointed. It will not wait for Parliament to debate the budget. And it certainly will not wait for Zambia to finish arguing about politics.The irony is that by the time the political dust settles, the next rainy season will already be approaching.And this is where that strange August shower becomes an interesting metaphor.We should not look at the rain that fell in Lusaka on 13 August and conclude that El Niño has arrived. That would be bad science.But neither should we look at it and shrug off the broader message: the climate system on which we have built our agriculture, energy system and economic expectations is becoming less predictable.The coming months deserve attention.If El Niño strengthens as forecast, Zambia could face a difficult 2026–27 agricultural season. The critical questions will not simply be whether it rains, but when it rains, how much it rains, how evenly that rainfall is distributed and whether there are long dry spells between rainfall events. Even a season that eventually receives reasonable total rainfall can be economically damaging if that rainfall arrives at the wrong time for crops.And that is why the country should be preparing now.Farmers need timely climate information. Energy planners need to stress-test hydropower assumptions. Government needs contingency plans for food and electricity. Businesses should consider their exposure to water, power and agricultural supply chains. Financial institutions should think about agricultural credit risk. Policymakers should incorporate climate scenarios into economic forecasts rather than treating weather as an external surprise.The lesson from the August rain is therefore not that Zambia is suddenly experiencing an El Niño.The lesson is that we should become much better at noticing the signals before they become shocks.On 13 August, Zambia was busy counting votes.Perhaps, in the months ahead, we should also start counting something else: rainfall, reservoir levels, crop conditions, temperatures and the probability of another difficult agricultural season.Because the next major economic shock may not arrive with a political speech, a currency announcement or a budget statement.It may arrive quietly in the clouds.We spent August watching the ballot. By November, we may be watching the sky.And by then, the question will no longer be whether Zambia saw the warning coming.It will be whether we prepared for it.

While Zambia Was Watching the Ballot, the Weather Was Sending a Warning